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Abstract	  Memory	  is	  dependent	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  factors	  from	  individual	  differences	  in	  storage	  capacity	  to	  cultural	  differences	  in	  attentional	  biases.	  While	  previous	  research	  has	  studied	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  intentionality	  of	  actions	  on	  memory,	  few	  have	  looked	  into	  how	  the	  intersection	  of	  intentionality	  and	  morality	  might	  affect	  memory.	  This	  study	  sought	  to	  examine	  how	  morality	  and	  intentionality	  affect	  participants’	  ability	  to	  remember	  specific	  information	  about	  an	  event.	  Participants	  read	  six	  stories	  from	  a	  single	  condition	  in	  a	  2	  (moral/neutral)	  x	  2	  (intentional/accidental)	  between-­‐subjects	  design.	  After	  half	  an	  hour	  of	  non-­‐verbal	  distractor	  tasks,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  freely	  recall	  as	  much	  information	  as	  they	  could	  from	  the	  previous	  stories.	  Although	  we	  found	  few	  significant	  results,	  we	  did	  find	  consistent	  trends	  suggesting	  that	  moral	  intentional	  scenarios	  improve	  participants’	  recall	  of	  overall	  memory	  about	  the	  event.	  Specifically,	  morality	  and	  intentionality	  show	  trends	  toward	  improving	  participants’	  memory	  for	  information	  about	  the	  story’s	  agent,	  their	  action,	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  their	  action	  was	  done	  intentionally	  or	  accidentally.	  The	  lack	  of	  significance	  could	  stem	  from	  a	  small	  sample	  size	  for	  each	  condition	  (N=20),	  which	  did	  not	  give	  enough	  power	  for	  statistical	  analyses.	  We	  discuss	  this	  and	  other	  limitations,	  as	  well	  as	  future	  directions	  on	  how	  these	  preliminary	  results	  apply	  to	  cultural	  and	  linguistic	  differences	  in	  memory	  and	  how	  this	  could	  have	  important	  implications	  for	  eyewitness	  testimony.	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Introduction	  What	  we	  remember	  about	  people	  and	  their	  actions	  can	  have	  a	  profound	  effect	  on	  our	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  life.	  Our	  judgments	  of	  the	  people	  around	  us	  rely	  heavily	  on	  our	  memory	  for	  their	  past	  actions	  and	  the	  effects	  these	  actions	  have	  on	  us.	  The	  majority	  of	  actions	  that	  we	  witness	  every	  day	  lack	  any	  moral	  implications,	  but	  occasionally	  we	  see,	  hear,	  or	  read	  about	  morally	  charged	  actions.	  These	  morally	  charged	  actions	  grab	  our	  attention	  and	  stick	  with	  us	  for	  days	  or	  weeks	  after	  the	  event,	  but	  what	  is	  it	  exactly	  about	  these	  events	  that	  are	  retained	  in	  our	  memory?	  Is	  it	  the	  person	  who	  performed	  the	  action	  or	  the	  consequences	  that	  follow	  the	  action	  that	  become	  our	  focus?	  Understanding	  which	  facets	  of	  an	  event	  are	  prioritized	  in	  our	  memory	  could	  reveal	  what	  aspects	  of	  morality	  are	  especially	  important	  to	  us.	  	  	  In	  the	  present	  study	  we	  will	  examine	  whether	  the	  circumstances	  surrounding	  an	  event,	  such	  as	  whether	  it	  is	  a	  morally	  charged	  scenario	  or	  morally	  neutral	  scenario,	  will	  affect	  what	  is	  remembered	  about	  the	  event.	  Since	  actions	  are	  so	  tightly	  tied	  to	  who	  performed	  the	  actions,	  we	  will	  also	  look	  at	  whether	  the	  intentionality	  of	  an	  agent	  performing	  the	  action	  affects	  how	  people	  might	  remember	  the	  event.	  We	  will	  also	  be	  looking	  at	  whether	  these	  different	  scenarios	  affect	  what	  details	  of	  an	  event	  are	  salient	  and	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  remembered,	  such	  as	  details	  about	  an	  agent	  or	  the	  action	  itself.	  	  	  Morality	  has	  been	  theorized	  to	  have	  a	  dyadic	  structure,	  which	  includes	  an	  agent	  intentionally	  performing	  an	  action	  that	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  harmful	  to	  a	  suffering	  patient	  (Gray	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Judging	  an	  act	  to	  be	  moral,	  immoral,	  or	  neutral	  requires	  the	  capacity	  to	  determine	  a	  behavior	  is	  intentional	  (Decety,	  2012).	  The	  intentionality	  of	  the	  agent	  and	  the	  perceived	  harm	  resulting	  from	  the	  act	  are	  integral	  to	  people’s	  judgments	  of	  whether	  the	  act	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is	  immoral	  or	  not.	  While	  perceived	  harm	  is	  a	  fairly	  straightforward	  concept	  with	  the	  perceiver	  deeming	  whether	  harm	  occurred	  or	  not,	  intentionality	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  a	  more	  complex	  concept.	  	  Intentionality	  has	  been	  extensively	  researched	  and	  has	  been	  found	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  facets	  when	  establishing	  blameworthiness	  of	  an	  action.	  Children	  as	  young	  as	  three	  years	  old	  will	  attribute	  more	  responsibility	  to	  an	  agent	  for	  an	  intentional	  action	  compared	  to	  an	  accidental	  action	  (Nunez	  &	  Harris,	  1998).	  Intentionality	  is	  also	  a	  stable,	  well-­‐known	  concept,	  with	  most	  adults	  defining	  intentionality	  in	  similar	  ways	  (Malle	  &	  Knobe,	  1997).	  Malle	  and	  Knobe	  found	  that	  there	  are	  five	  necessary	  elements	  to	  determining	  the	  intentionality	  of	  an	  action.	  These	  elements	  are	  the	  desire	  for	  an	  outcome,	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  action	  will	  lead	  to	  that	  outcome,	  the	  intention	  to	  perform	  that	  act,	  the	  awareness	  of	  performing	  that	  act,	  and	  the	  skill	  to	  perform	  that	  act	  so	  that	  the	  desired	  outcome	  occurs.	  They	  found	  that	  if	  any	  of	  these	  elements	  are	  absent	  then	  the	  presumed	  intentionality	  of	  an	  action	  drops	  significantly.	  The	  example	  they	  used	  was	  of	  Jerry	  who	  was	  a	  novice	  at	  playing	  darts	  and	  was	  not	  usually	  good	  at	  games	  like	  darts.	  On	  his	  first	  try	  he	  hit	  a	  triple	  20,	  which	  his	  friend	  dismissed	  as	  a	  fluke.	  We	  can	  say	  that	  Jerry	  had	  the	  desire	  to	  hit	  this	  impressive	  score,	  had	  the	  intent	  to	  hit	  this	  score,	  and	  had	  the	  awareness	  that	  he	  was	  performing	  the	  act	  of	  throwing	  the	  dart	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  this	  score,	  but	  he	  lacked	  the	  skill	  to	  actually	  hit	  this,	  so	  most	  people	  would	  say	  that	  Jerry	  did	  not	  intentionally	  hit	  a	  triple	  20.	  However,	  when	  told	  that	  Jerry	  hit	  a	  triple	  20	  again,	  people	  were	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  regard	  Jerry	  as	  intentionally	  hitting	  the	  triple	  20.	  Hitting	  this	  score	  twice	  in	  a	  row	  demonstrates	  some	  sort	  of	  skill	  and,	  therefore,	  the	  intentionality	  judgments	  increased.	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   However,	  there	  is	  also	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  intentionality	  is	  automatically	  inferred	  from	  actions	  and	  that	  it	  takes	  cognitive	  effort	  to	  override	  this	  intentionality	  bias	  (Rosset,	  2008).	  When	  presented	  with	  actions	  that	  are	  normally	  done	  on	  accident,	  but	  could	  be	  done	  on	  purpose	  (i.e.	  “He	  hit	  a	  man	  with	  his	  car”)	  participants	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  determine	  that	  these	  actions	  were	  done	  intentionally	  under	  a	  speeded	  condition.	  Additionally,	  when	  presented	  with	  actions	  that	  are	  always	  considered	  to	  be	  done	  accidentally,	  (i.e.	  “He	  poked	  himself	  in	  the	  eye”)	  there	  were	  some	  participants	  in	  the	  speeded	  condition	  who	  deemed	  these	  actions	  to	  be	  intentional.	  This	  indicates	  that	  when	  put	  under	  time	  pressure	  people	  cannot	  inhibit	  their	  automatic	  inference	  of	  intentionality	  as	  well	  as	  when	  they	  are	  given	  a	  longer	  amount	  of	  time	  to	  respond.	  Rosset	  also	  found	  that	  the	  effortful	  process	  of	  overriding	  the	  intentionality	  bias	  leads	  people	  to	  remember	  accidental	  actions	  better.	  Participants	  read	  sentences	  about	  both	  intentional	  actions	  and	  accidental	  actions.	  The	  experimental	  group	  was	  asked	  to	  decide	  whether	  the	  action	  was	  done	  intentionally	  or	  unintentionally	  and	  the	  control	  group	  was	  asked	  to	  decide	  whether	  the	  action	  was	  pleasant	  or	  unpleasant.	  When	  asked	  to	  recall	  as	  many	  sentences	  as	  they	  could	  after	  a	  brief	  distraction	  period,	  the	  group	  who	  had	  to	  make	  intentionality	  judgments	  remembered	  more	  unintentional	  actions	  than	  intentional.	  However,	  people	  in	  the	  control	  group	  remembered	  more	  intentional	  actions	  than	  accidental.	  This	  indicates	  that	  the	  effort	  required	  to	  override	  the	  intentionality	  bias	  helped	  to	  encode	  this	  information	  for	  later	  recall.	  	  	   In	  Rosset’s	  (2008)	  study	  the	  participants	  were	  only	  asked	  to	  recall	  the	  sentence	  and	  these	  responses	  were	  coded	  as	  either	  full	  or	  partial	  sentences.	  The	  gender	  of	  the	  pronoun	  or	  the	  agent	  could	  be	  changed	  and	  still	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  full	  sentence	  as	  long	  as	  the	  verb	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and	  object	  were	  correct.	  However,	  another	  important	  facet	  of	  determining	  responsibility	  or	  blameworthiness	  of	  an	  action	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  agent	  doing	  the	  action.	  In	  contrast	  to	  these	  findings,	  Camilleri	  (2010)	  found	  that	  when	  participants	  were	  presented	  with	  videos	  of	  different	  colored	  triangles	  that	  were	  either	  helpers	  or	  hinderers	  and	  were	  acting	  either	  intentionally	  or	  unintentionally,	  participants	  remembered	  the	  color	  of	  the	  triangles	  (agents)	  better	  in	  the	  intentional	  condition	  than	  the	  unintentional	  condition.	  While	  this	  is	  an	  interesting	  finding,	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  these	  results	  can	  be	  generalized	  to	  remembering	  agent	  information	  given	  that	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  remember	  colored	  triangles,	  not	  human	  characteristics.	  These	  studies	  are	  important	  for	  understanding	  the	  cognitive	  processes	  underlying	  moral	  judgments,	  such	  as	  how	  intentionality,	  agent	  information,	  and	  actions	  are	  encoded	  and	  combined	  in	  memory.	  	  This	  encoding	  process	  has	  been	  found	  to	  be	  a	  resource	  demanding	  process,	  especially	  when	  agent	  and	  action	  information	  is	  bound	  together	  (Wood,	  2008).	  Wood	  found	  that	  the	  visual	  system	  consists	  of	  separate	  systems	  for	  retaining	  action	  information	  and	  agent	  information	  and	  the	  capacity	  for	  remembering	  these	  types	  of	  information	  are	  separate	  (Wood,	  2007).	  To	  test	  how	  much	  information	  could	  be	  stored	  in	  each	  of	  these	  systems,	  participants	  were	  presented	  with	  computer-­‐generated	  figures	  wearing	  different	  colored	  shirts	  performing	  everyday	  actions	  such	  as	  raising	  a	  knee.	  The	  participants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  one	  of	  four	  conditions.	  In	  the	  first	  condition,	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  remember	  only	  the	  action,	  in	  the	  second	  condition	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  remember	  only	  the	  agent,	  in	  the	  third	  condition	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  remember	  either	  the	  agent	  or	  the	  action,	  and	  in	  the	  fourth	  condition	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  remember	  the	  agent	  and	  the	  action	  together.	  It	  was	  found	  that	  participants’	  memory	  capacity	  for	  the	  actions-­‐only	  condition	  was	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significantly	  worse	  than	  the	  agents-­‐only	  condition,	  but	  the	  memory	  for	  agents	  and	  actions	  in	  the	  agents	  or	  actions	  conditions	  was	  the	  same,	  indicating	  that	  memory	  for	  agents	  does	  not	  interfere	  with	  memory	  for	  actions	  and	  vice	  versa.	  Finally,	  memory	  capacity	  was	  significantly	  lower	  in	  the	  binding	  condition.	  The	  either	  condition	  showed	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  retain	  information	  about	  multiple	  agents	  and	  actions	  simultaneously,	  but	  the	  poor	  memory	  capacity	  for	  the	  binding	  condition	  indicates	  that	  these	  types	  of	  information	  are	  not	  maintained	  together	  (Wood,	  2008).	  	  These	  results	  indicate	  that	  there	  is	  a	  trade-­‐off	  between	  the	  amount	  of	  information	  maintained	  and	  whether	  the	  information	  is	  bound	  together,	  showing	  that	  the	  binding	  process	  is	  resource	  demanding.	  The	  actions	  that	  were	  tested	  in	  this	  study	  were	  neutral	  and	  had	  no	  moral	  consequences,	  but	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  binding	  agents	  and	  actions	  would	  be	  better	  for	  events	  that	  have	  moral	  consequences.	  It	  seems	  that	  it	  would	  be	  more	  important	  to	  remember	  the	  action	  and	  the	  agent	  together	  when	  trying	  to	  remember	  a	  moral	  event.	  However,	  this	  research	  indicates	  that	  if	  agent	  and	  action	  information	  is	  bound	  together,	  other	  information	  about	  the	  event	  could	  be	  lost	  because	  of	  the	  resource-­‐demanding	  nature	  of	  the	  binding	  process.	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  this	  information	  binding	  process	  is	  different	  for	  everyday	  actions	  that	  lack	  consequences	  (as	  were	  tested	  in	  Wood’s	  2008	  study)	  and	  moral	  actions	  where	  the	  agent	  and	  their	  intent	  are	  extremely	  relevant	  for	  consequences,	  blame,	  and	  responsibility.	  This	  distinction	  could	  mean	  that	  people	  are	  better	  at	  binding	  agents	  and	  actions	  for	  moral	  events	  in	  comparison	  to	  events	  that	  lack	  any	  moral	  salience.	  Imagine	  someone	  is	  a	  witness	  to	  a	  man	  stealing	  a	  woman’s	  purse.	  Perhaps	  the	  witness	  can	  easily	  remember	  that	  the	  man	  was	  about	  six	  feet	  tall	  and	  wearing	  a	  blue	  shirt	  and	  that	  he	  knocked	  the	  woman	  down	  as	  he	  wrestled	  the	  purse	  from	  her.	  The	  witness’s	  attentional	  bias	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would	  be	  towards	  the	  action	  and	  the	  event	  so	  they	  might	  have	  a	  more	  difficult	  time	  remembering	  the	  exact	  cross	  streets	  where	  the	  event	  occurred,	  what	  the	  weather	  was	  at	  the	  time,	  or	  in	  which	  direction	  the	  agent	  ran.	  	  This	  example	  is	  clearly	  a	  more	  complicated	  event	  than	  a	  computer-­‐generated	  figure	  lifting	  their	  leg,	  so	  the	  encoding	  process	  could	  be	  different	  for	  short,	  simple	  actions	  and	  longer,	  more	  complex	  actions.	  It	  is	  these	  complex	  actions	  that	  actually	  occur	  in	  the	  world	  around	  us.	  Complex	  actions,	  morally	  charged	  or	  morally	  neutral,	  occur	  in	  a	  specific	  context,	  have	  causes	  and	  consequences,	  and	  are	  performed	  by	  a	  certain	  person	  acting	  unintentionally	  or	  intentionally	  who	  has	  their	  own	  set	  of	  characteristics.	  Because	  actions	  typically	  have	  a	  variety	  of	  facets,	  we	  decided	  to	  look	  at	  whether	  more	  complicated	  actions	  would	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  what	  people	  remember.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  people	  are	  better	  at	  remembering	  more	  complex	  actions	  because	  they	  do	  it	  every	  day.	  It	  is	  common	  for	  people	  to	  remember	  actions	  in	  a	  real	  world	  context,	  but	  it	  is	  probably	  less	  common	  for	  people	  to	  remember	  a	  series	  of	  simple	  actions	  that	  have	  no	  cause	  or	  consequence.	  However,	  with	  more	  complex	  actions	  there	  is	  more	  to	  be	  remembered.	  In	  Wood’s	  study	  there	  were	  only	  two	  pieces	  of	  information	  that	  had	  to	  be	  remembered,	  but	  for	  real	  world	  actions,	  there	  are	  so	  many	  facets	  that	  some	  information	  may	  be	  prioritized	  over	  other	  information.	  By	  testing	  people’s	  memory	  for	  multiple	  types	  of	  information,	  we	  can	  try	  to	  reveal	  what	  information	  is	  prioritized.	  	  	  	   Much	  of	  the	  research	  previously	  conducted	  on	  intentionality	  involved	  either	  non-­‐human	  agents	  or	  agents	  performing	  simple,	  everyday	  actions.	  We	  seek	  to	  investigate	  how	  adding	  the	  variable	  of	  morality	  could	  also	  play	  a	  role	  in	  memory.	  Specifically,	  we	  aim	  to	  investigate	  how	  morality	  and	  intentionality	  affect	  participants’	  ability	  to	  remember	  specific	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information	  about	  an	  event.	  By	  testing	  memory	  for	  multiple	  informational	  categories	  of	  a	  story,	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  extract	  what	  information	  is	  more	  readily	  encoded	  in	  memory	  and	  is,	  therefore,	  more	  important	  to	  morality.	  We	  hypothesize	  that	  agent	  information	  will	  be	  prioritized	  in	  memory	  when	  presented	  with	  actions	  that	  have	  moral	  implications,	  due	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  agency	  in	  morality.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  we	  expect	  that	  other	  information	  might	  not	  be	  encoded	  in	  memory	  because	  of	  the	  resource	  demanding	  nature	  of	  binding	  agent	  and	  action	  information.	  By	  comparing	  moral	  and	  neutral	  conditions,	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  ascertain	  whether	  some	  information,	  such	  as	  intention,	  is	  always	  important	  for	  memory,	  or	  if	  morally	  charged	  actions	  make	  this	  information	  more	  salient.	  	  	  
Methods	  
Participants	  	  Ninety-­‐one	  participants	  (mean	  age=19.8,	  SD=1.76),	  sixteen	  male	  and	  seventy-­‐five	  female,	  took	  part	  in	  an	  hour-­‐long	  study.	  The	  participants	  were	  recruited	  from	  Boston	  College	  by	  means	  of	  posted	  fliers	  looking	  for	  participants	  to	  partake	  in	  current	  psychological	  studies	  in	  exchange	  for	  monetary	  compensation.	  Participants	  were	  also	  recruited	  from	  Boston	  College	  SONA,	  which	  gives	  students	  the	  opportunity	  to	  participate	  in	  studies	  either	  for	  money	  or	  for	  credit	  towards	  introductory	  psychology	  courses.	  
Procedure	  	  The	  study	  consisted	  of	  three	  different	  stages.	  The	  first	  stage	  was	  the	  encoding	  stage	  where	  participants	  read	  and	  familiarized	  themselves	  with	  six	  stories.	  This	  stage	  lasted	  for	  ten	  minutes.	  The	  second	  stage	  was	  the	  delay	  stage	  where	  the	  experimenter	  administered	  a	  series	  of	  non-­‐verbal	  distractor	  tasks.	  This	  stage	  was	  timed	  to	  last	  for	  thirty	  minutes.	  The	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final	  stage	  was	  the	  recall	  stage,	  in	  which	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  freely	  recall	  as	  accurately	  as	  possible	  what	  they	  remembered	  from	  the	  previous	  six	  stories.	  This	  stage	  lasted	  as	  long	  as	  the	  participant	  needed.	  	  The	  study	  was	  conducted	  as	  a	  2	  (moral/neutral)	  x	  2	  (intentional/accidental)	  between-­‐subjects	  design,	  such	  that	  each	  participant	  was	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  one	  version	  of	  the	  stories	  (e.g.	  moral-­‐intentional).	  Participants	  were	  presented	  with	  the	  six	  stories	  by	  means	  of	  a	  survey	  on	  Qualtrics	  Survey	  Software.	  The	  moral,	  intentional	  version	  of	  the	  story	  involved	  an	  agent	  purposefully	  doing	  an	  action	  that	  had	  moral	  implications	  (e.g.	  Sally	  walks	  up	  and	  unplugs	  his	  feeding	  tube,	  taking	  the	  man	  off	  of	  life	  support.).	  The	  moral,	  accidental	  version	  involved	  an	  agent	  accidentally	  performing	  an	  action	  that	  had	  moral	  implications	  (e.g.	  Ben	  pulls	  into	  the	  lot	  and	  does	  not	  see	  her	  standing	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  road.	  He	  accidentally	  hits	  her,	  knocking	  her	  to	  the	  ground.).	  The	  neutral,	  intentional	  version	  involved	  an	  agent	  purposefully	  doing	  an	  action	  that	  had	  no	  moral	  implications	  (e.g.	  She	  pulls	  the	  lever	  causing	  the	  hatch	  to	  open	  and	  some	  food	  to	  fall	  into	  the	  cage.	  The	  snake	  eats	  the	  food,	  which	  then	  gets	  slowly	  digested.)	  	  The	  neutral,	  accidental	  version	  involved	  an	  agent	  accidentally	  performing	  an	  action	  that	  had	  no	  moral	  implications	  (e.g.	  As	  Chris	  is	  sewing	  the	  button,	  he	  slips	  and	  pokes	  his	  roommate’s	  chest	  with	  his	  forefinger;	  for	  full	  versions	  of	  the	  stories,	  see	  Appendix	  A).	  	  	   After	  reading	  these	  stories	  during	  the	  encoding	  phase,	  participants	  moved	  on	  to	  the	  delay	  phase	  in	  which	  the	  participants	  completed	  three	  different	  non-­‐verbal	  tasks.	  We	  chose	  to	  use	  non-­‐verbal	  tasks	  so	  that	  the	  participant	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  mentally	  rehearse	  the	  stories	  in	  their	  minds,	  which	  would	  have	  aided	  in	  recalling	  the	  stories	  in	  the	  next	  step.	  Additionally,	  we	  did	  not	  want	  extra	  verbal	  information	  to	  distract	  from	  the	  original	  stories	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and	  hinder	  their	  memory	  for	  the	  stories.	  The	  first	  distractor	  task	  that	  the	  experimenter	  administered	  was	  a	  digit	  span	  test	  from	  the	  third	  edition	  of	  the	  Wechsler	  Adult	  Intelligence	  and	  Memory	  Scale	  (WAIS-­‐III)	  in	  which	  the	  experimenter	  read	  out	  loud	  a	  series	  of	  digits	  at	  the	  rate	  of	  one	  digit	  per	  second	  without	  voice	  fluctuations	  of	  any	  kind.	  The	  participant	  then	  repeated	  the	  numbers	  back	  to	  the	  experimenter	  exactly	  how	  they	  heard	  them.	  There	  were	  eight	  items	  with	  two	  trials	  per	  item.	  The	  first	  item	  contained	  two	  digit	  sequences,	  the	  second	  item	  contained	  three	  digit	  sequences,	  the	  third	  item	  contained	  four	  digit	  sequences,	  and	  so	  on	  up	  to	  nine	  digit	  sequences.	  The	  experimenter	  recorded	  the	  responses.	  If	  a	  participant	  failed	  on	  both	  trials	  of	  the	  item,	  the	  test	  was	  over.	  The	  experimenter	  then	  conducted	  the	  backwards	  digit	  span	  task	  with	  the	  same	  set	  up	  as	  the	  previous	  task	  except	  that	  the	  participant	  had	  to	  repeat	  the	  numbers	  back	  to	  the	  experimenter	  in	  the	  reverse	  order	  from	  what	  the	  experimenter	  read.	  For	  example,	  if	  the	  experimenter	  read	  the	  digits	  “7-­‐1-­‐9”,	  the	  participant	  should	  have	  repeated	  back,	  “9-­‐1-­‐7”.	  The	  experimenter	  recorded	  the	  responses.	  If	  the	  participant	  failed	  on	  both	  trials	  of	  the	  item,	  the	  test	  was	  over.	  	  The	  experimenter	  then	  administered	  the	  Self-­‐Ordered	  Pointing	  Task	  (SOPT;	  Petrides	  &	  Milner,	  1982).	  In	  this	  task,	  there	  were	  twelve	  test	  sheets	  each	  with	  a	  grid	  of	  twelve	  squares	  each	  containing	  a	  unique	  pattern.	  Each	  sheet	  had	  a	  random	  ordering	  of	  the	  twelve	  patterned	  squares,	  however	  the	  patterns	  themselves	  remained	  constant	  throughout	  the	  test.	  The	  participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  touch	  all	  of	  the	  squares,	  one	  at	  a	  time	  and	  in	  any	  order	  that	  they	  wished	  without	  touching	  any	  patterned	  square	  more	  than	  once	  throughout	  the	  test.	  Once	  a	  square	  had	  been	  touched	  on	  a	  sheet,	  the	  participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  flip	  that	  sheet	  over	  and	  move	  onto	  the	  next	  one.	  The	  experimenter	  recorded	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their	  responses.	  The	  digit	  span	  task	  and	  SOPT	  were	  both	  used	  as	  distractor	  tasks	  because	  they	  seek	  to	  measure	  components	  of	  working	  memory	  capacity.	  	  The	  experimenter	  then	  gave	  the	  participant	  the	  third	  distractor	  task.	  This	  task	  consisted	  of	  six	  to	  twelve	  Sudoku	  puzzles.	  The	  puzzles	  were	  9x9	  grids	  in	  which	  the	  participant	  had	  to	  fill	  in	  the	  grid	  so	  that	  each	  column,	  row,	  and	  3x3	  square	  within	  the	  grid	  contained	  a	  single	  digit	  from	  1	  to	  9	  without	  repeating	  any	  numbers.	  When	  the	  half	  hour	  expired,	  the	  experimenter	  entered	  the	  room	  and	  told	  the	  participant	  they	  could	  stop	  working	  on	  the	  Sudoku	  puzzle	  and	  instructed	  them	  to	  continue	  onto	  the	  final	  step	  on	  the	  computer.	  When	  the	  participant	  moved	  onto	  the	  next	  page	  of	  the	  survey	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  try	  to	  remember	  the	  stories	  that	  they	  read	  earlier	  and	  rewrite	  the	  stories	  that	  they	  read	  as	  accurately	  as	  possible.	  	  
Data	  Analysis	  	  Both	  the	  forward	  and	  backward	  digit	  span	  tasks	  are	  working	  memory	  measures	  of	  the	  WAIS-­‐III,	  but	  each	  measures	  a	  slightly	  different	  part	  of	  the	  working	  memory.	  The	  forward	  digit	  span	  task	  mainly	  measures	  attention	  and	  short-­‐term	  auditory	  memory	  while	  the	  backward	  digit	  span	  task	  primarily	  measures	  verbal	  working	  memory	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  manipulate	  verbal	  information	  while	  in	  temporary	  storage	  (Conklin,	  et.	  al.,	  2000;	  www.nlsinfo.org).	  The	  SOPT	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  working	  memory	  that	  requires	  executive	  and	  visuospatial	  processing	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  strategic	  responding	  and	  organization1	  (Petrides,	  1982;	  Ross,	  et.	  al.,	  2007).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  digit	  span	  task	  and	  SOPT	  were	  excluded	  from	  analysis	  because	  they	  measure	  working	  memory	  ,	  which	  was	  not	  related	  to	  the	  questions	  being	  investigated	  in	  this	  study.	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   The	  digit	  span	  task	  score	  has	  three	  elements,	  the	  forward	  score,	  the	  backward	  score,	  and	  the	  total	  score.	  The	  number	  of	  correct	  responses	  for	  the	  forward	  section	  is	  added	  up	  as	  well	  as	  the	  number	  of	  correct	  responses	  for	  the	  backward	  section.	  These	  sums	  are	  then	  added	  together	  for	  the	  total	  score.	  	  	   The	  SOPT	  has	  two	  different	  scores,	  one	  is	  the	  span	  score	  and	  the	  other	  is	  the	  error	  score.	  The	  span	  score	  is	  the	  number	  of	  grids	  the	  participant	  goes	  through	  before	  making	  an	  error	  (repeating	  a	  pattern).	  The	  error	  score	  is	  the	  number	  of	  errors	  or	  repeats	  the	  participant	  makes	  throughout	  the	  test.	  	  	  	   The	  experimenter	  coded	  the	  participants’	  responses	  as	  proportions	  of	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  information	  that	  could	  be	  remembered	  from	  any	  given	  story.	  The	  stories	  were	  broken	  down	  into	  six	  information	  categories	  (agent	  name,	  agent	  details,	  context	  details,	  action,	  intent,	  and	  consequence).	  The	  experimenter	  determined	  how	  many	  total	  pieces	  of	  information	  could	  be	  remembered	  in	  each	  category	  for	  each	  story.	  For	  the	  agent	  name,	  intent,	  and	  consequence	  categories	  there	  was	  only	  one	  piece	  of	  information	  that	  could	  be	  recalled	  (i.e.	  the	  participant	  either	  remembered	  the	  agent’s	  name	  correctly	  or	  incorrectly).	  For	  these	  categories	  the	  participant	  received	  either	  a	  one	  for	  a	  correct	  response	  or	  a	  zero	  for	  an	  incorrect	  response.	  The	  agent	  details,	  context	  details,	  and	  action	  categories	  had	  differing	  amounts	  of	  information	  that	  could	  be	  recalled	  for	  each	  story.	  The	  amount	  of	  agent	  details	  ranged	  from	  one	  to	  three,	  the	  amount	  of	  context	  details	  ranged	  from	  six	  to	  eight,	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  action	  information	  ranged	  from	  one	  to	  three.	  While	  the	  amount	  of	  information	  varied	  across	  stories,	  each	  story	  had	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  information	  across	  conditions.	  These	  categories	  were	  coded	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  information	  that	  could	  be	  recalled,	  as	  was	  previously	  determined	  by	  the	  experimenter.	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Results	  Out	  of	  the	  ninety-­‐one	  participants	  who	  took	  part	  in	  this	  study,	  eleven	  were	  excluded	  from	  analysis	  for	  failure	  to	  follow	  instructions,	  which	  reduced	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  they	  spent	  on	  the	  encoding	  phase	  of	  the	  study.	  We	  were	  then	  left	  with	  twenty	  participants	  for	  each	  of	  the	  four	  conditions.	  Across	  all	  conditions	  and	  stories	  a	  total	  of	  fifty-­‐nine	  stories	  out	  of	  480	  total	  presented	  stories	  were	  not	  remembered	  at	  all.	  	  We	  first	  collapsed	  all	  information	  across	  the	  six	  categories	  and	  ran	  a	  2	  (moral/neutral)	  x	  2	  (intentional/accidental)	  ANOVA	  on	  the	  overall	  proportion	  of	  information	  recalled.	  There	  was	  a	  trending	  main	  effect	  of	  morality	  for	  intentional	  cases	  F(1,76)=1.298,	  p=.258	  	  and	  an	  interaction	  between	  morality	  and	  intentionality	  F(1,76)=.806,	  p=.372	  (see	  Figure	  1).	  An	  independent	  samples	  t-­‐test	  was	  conducted	  to	  compare	  the	  overall	  recall	  between	  the	  moral-­‐intentional	  and	  moral-­‐accidental	  conditions.	  There	  was	  a	  difference	  between	  moral-­‐intentional	  cases	  (M=.7084,	  SD=.183)	  and	  moral-­‐accidental	  cases	  (M=.6303,	  SD=.184)	  that	  was	  trending	  towards	  significance	  t(38)=1.348,	  p=.186.	  It	  appears	  that	  intentionality	  in	  moral	  cases	  is	  enhancing	  participants’	  overall	  memory	  for	  the	  stories	  and	  that	  there	  is	  little	  difference	  in	  overall	  recall	  across	  the	  other	  three	  conditions.	  	  Next,	  we	  ran	  a	  multivariate	  ANOVA	  on	  each	  of	  the	  six	  information	  categories.	  We	  found	  a	  trending	  main	  effect	  of	  morality	  for	  agent	  details	  F(1,76)=3.959,	  p=.050,	  action	  F(1,76)=2.719,	  p=.103,	  and	  intention	  F(1,76)=3.626,	  p=0.061.	  This	  indicates	  that	  moral	  scenarios	  enhance	  participants’	  memory	  for	  agent	  details,	  actions,	  and	  intention.	  We	  also	  found	  a	  trending	  main	  effect	  of	  intentionality	  for	  agent	  name	  F(1,76)=2.015,	  p=.160	  and	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Figure	  1:	  ANOVA	  trending	  main	  effect	  of	  morality	  for	  intentional	  cases.	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agent	  details	  F(1,76)=1.874,	  p=.175	  (see	  Figure	  2).	  It	  also	  appears	  that	  intentional	  scenarios	  enhance	  participants’	  memory	  for	  an	  agent’s	  name	  and	  details	  about	  the	  agent.	  The	  independent-­‐samples	  t-­‐test	  of	  agent	  details	  found	  that	  both	  intentional	  over	  accidental,	  t(38)=1.570,	  p=.125	  and	  moral	  over	  neutral,	  t(38)=1.986,	  p=.054)	  were	  trending	  towards	  driving	  this	  effect,	  meaning	  participants	  in	  the	  moral	  intentional	  condition	  remembered	  agent	  details	  better	  than	  any	  of	  the	  other	  three	  conditions	  (see	  Figure	  3).	  When	  conducting	  an	  independent-­‐samples	  t-­‐test	  for	  agent	  name,	  we	  found	  that	  intentional	  over	  accidental	  t(38)=1.334,	  p=.190	  was	  trending	  towards	  driving	  this	  effect,	  so	  participants	  who	  received	  an	  intentional	  condition,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  it	  was	  a	  moral	  or	  neutral	  condition,	  remembered	  the	  agent’s	  name	  better	  than	  participants	  who	  received	  an	  accidental	  condition	  (see	  Figure	  3).	  When	  all	  neutral	  cases	  are	  excluded,	  intentionality	  also	  had	  a	  trending	  effect	  for	  context	  details	  t(38)=1.343,	  p=.187	  and	  intention	  t(38)=1.462,	  p=.152	  (see	  Figure	  4).	  This	  indicates	  that	  intentional	  scenarios	  enhance	  participants’	  memory	  for	  context	  details	  and	  the	  agent’s	  intent	  when	  completing	  the	  action.	  Additionally,	  when	  all	  neutral	  cases	  were	  excluded	  from	  analysis,	  morality	  had	  an	  effect	  trending	  towards	  significant	  for	  intention	  t(38)=1.965,	  p=.057	  and	  action	  t(38)=1.689,	  p=.099	  (see	  Figure	  4).	  It	  appears	  that	  moral	  conditions	  lead	  a	  participant	  to	  remember	  an	  agent’s	  action	  and	  their	  intention	  better	  than	  in	  neutral	  conditions.	  On	  conducting	  independent-­‐samples	  t-­‐tests	  that	  filtered	  out	  all	  moral	  cases,	  we	  found	  that	  intentionality	  had	  no	  effect	  on	  any	  of	  the	  six	  categories.	  Intentionality	  then	  only	  has	  an	  effect	  for	  the	  moral	  conditions,	  not	  the	  neutral	  conditions.	  For	  participants	  who	  received	  either	  of	  the	  neutral	  conditions,	  their	  memory	  for	  intentional	  or	  accidental	  scenarios	  did	  not	  have	  differences	  trending	  towards	  significant	  at	  all.	  Similarly,	  when	  we	  filtered	  out	  all	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Figure	  3:	  Independent	  samples	  t-­‐test	  shows	  trending	  effect	  of	  morality	  and	  intentionality	  for	  agent	  details	  and	  a	  trending	  effect	  of	  intentionality	  for	  agent	  name.	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accidental	  cases,	  morality	  did	  not	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  participants’	  ability	  to	  recall	  information	  across	  any	  of	  the	  categories.	  Due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  significant	  results,	  we	  decided	  to	  run	  a	  6	  (story)	  x	  2	  (moral/neutral)	  x	  2	  (intentional/accidental)	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  with	  story	  as	  the	  within-­‐subjects	  factor	  and	  the	  average	  proportion	  of	  information	  remembered	  as	  the	  between-­‐subjects	  factor,	  to	  investigate	  if	  the	  null	  results	  stemmed	  from	  differences	  across	  stories.	  We	  observed	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  story	  F(5,380)=3.464,	  p=.004,	  indicating	  that	  participants’	  recall	  ability	  differed	  across	  stories,	  regardless	  of	  condition.	  Looking	  at	  average	  recall	  across	  conditions	  for	  each	  story,	  we	  found	  that	  Story	  1	  was	  remembered	  the	  least	  (M=.5601,	  SD=.319)	  and	  Story	  6	  was	  remembered	  the	  most	  (M=.7058,	  SD=.269)	  (see	  Figure	  5	  and	  Appendix	  for	  full	  stories).	  It	  is	  unclear	  exactly	  what	  is	  driving	  this	  effect.	  Because	  the	  stories	  were	  presented	  in	  a	  randomized	  order	  there	  could	  have	  been	  recency	  effects	  of	  some	  kind	  with	  participants	  remembering	  the	  first	  story	  that	  was	  presented	  better	  than	  the	  subsequent	  stories.	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  the	  information	  in	  the	  sixth	  story	  was	  somehow	  more	  salient	  than	  the	  information	  in	  the	  first	  story.	  	  We	  then	  conducted	  another	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  as	  a	  6	  (story)	  x	  6	  (category)	  x	  2	  (moral/neutral)	  x	  2	  (intentional/accidental)	  design.	  Critically,	  we	  found	  a	  significant	  interaction	  between	  category,	  story,	  and	  morality	  F(25,1900)=1.787,	  p=.010.	  This	  indicates	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  our	  moral	  versus	  neutral	  manipulation	  on	  memory	  for	  information	  categories	  differed	  across	  the	  stories.	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Story	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  2	  Story	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  Story	  6	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would	  be	  important	  to	  remember	  both	  the	  agent	  and	  the	  action	  that	  they	  performed	  so	  that	  blame	  and	  punishment	  may	  be	  assigned	  to	  the	  correct	  person.	  While	  agent	  name	  in	  the	  moral	  accidental	  condition	  is	  only	  correlated	  with	  context,	  agent	  details	  are	  highly	  correlated	  with	  all	  other	  categories,	  which	  could	  indicate	  that	  participants	  in	  this	  condition	  are	  focusing	  more	  on	  details	  associated	  with	  the	  agent	  than	  the	  agent’s	  name	  itself.	  The	  neutral	  conditions	  seem	  to	  have	  lack	  a	  straightforward	  pattern	  of	  agent	  name	  correlations,	  which	  could	  simply	  mean	  that	  these	  correlations	  are	  happening	  by	  chance	  without	  a	  clear	  explanation.	  	  
	  
Discussion	  
	   The	  main	  goals	  of	  this	  study	  were	  to	  investigate	  how	  actions	  with	  moral	  implications	  might	  affect	  people’s	  memory	  for	  events	  especially	  when	  these	  actions	  were	  done	  intentionally.	  Intentionality	  appears	  to	  be	  highly	  linked	  to	  morality	  given	  that	  intentionality	  of	  an	  action	  only	  had	  an	  effect	  on	  memory	  for	  moral	  actions.	  This	  could	  indicate	  that	  intentionality	  is	  an	  important	  facet	  of	  morality,	  rather	  than	  a	  completely	  separate	  concept	  when	  it	  is	  encoded	  in	  memory.	  	   Although	  almost	  all	  of	  the	  results	  we	  found	  were	  not	  significant,	  the	  trends	  we	  found	  are	  promising	  and	  could	  become	  significant	  if	  changes	  are	  made	  to	  the	  study,	  which	  will	  be	  further	  discussed	  in	  the	  limitations.	  The	  results	  we	  found	  appear	  to	  indicate	  that	  intentional	  moral	  stories	  might	  enhance	  a	  participant’s	  memory	  for	  certain	  details	  of	  the	  story.	  While	  all	  of	  the	  main	  effects	  are	  just	  trends,	  they	  are	  trending	  in	  the	  correct	  direction	  to	  make	  these	  tentative	  claims.	  As	  we	  first	  examined	  in	  the	  results	  section,	  participants	  who	  received	  moral	  intentional	  stories	  remembered	  more	  information	  from	  the	  story	  than	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any	  of	  the	  other	  conditions.	  Moral	  scenarios	  improved	  memory	  for	  details	  about	  the	  agent,	  the	  action,	  and	  the	  intention,	  while	  intentional	  scenarios	  improved	  memory	  for	  the	  agent’s	  name	  and	  details	  about	  the	  agent.	  When	  looking	  at	  these	  results	  from	  an	  eyewitness	  testimony	  standpoint,	  these	  are	  the	  most	  relevant	  pieces	  of	  information	  to	  remember	  when	  determining	  innocence,	  guilt,	  and	  punishment.	  Perhaps	  even	  more	  interesting	  is	  that	  intentionality	  only	  has	  an	  effect	  on	  memory	  when	  the	  scenario	  is	  also	  morally	  charged.	  This	  result	  further	  supports	  Kurt	  Gray’s	  research	  that	  intentionality	  is	  a	  vital	  facet	  of	  morality	  (Gray,	  Waytz	  &	  Young,	  2012).	  There	  are	  fewer	  consequences	  of	  neutral	  actions	  so	  whether	  the	  action	  is	  done	  intentionally	  or	  accidentally	  is	  not	  as	  important	  as	  it	  is	  for	  morally	  charged	  actions	  because	  there	  are	  vital	  consequences	  and	  the	  intentionality	  of	  the	  action	  matters	  a	  great	  deal.	  In	  the	  legal	  realm,	  intentionality	  can	  be	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  murder	  conviction	  and	  a	  manslaughter	  conviction.	  	  	   When	  examining	  the	  effect	  that	  each	  story	  had	  on	  a	  participant’s	  memory,	  we	  found	  that	  the	  sixth	  story	  led	  to	  the	  most	  information	  being	  recalled	  and	  the	  first	  story	  led	  to	  the	  least	  amount	  of	  information	  being	  recalled.	  The	  sixth	  story	  was	  about	  an	  uncle	  making	  sandwiches	  for	  his	  two	  young	  nieces	  to	  take	  to	  school.	  This	  story	  could	  have	  been	  remembered	  better	  because	  it	  is	  more	  of	  an	  everyday	  scenario	  in	  which	  someone	  could	  find	  themselves.	  However,	  the	  first	  story	  was	  about	  a	  volunteer	  nurse	  who	  is	  working	  in	  a	  hospital	  and	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  supervising	  a	  man	  on	  life	  support.	  Most	  people	  would	  have	  a	  difficult	  time	  finding	  themselves	  in	  this	  scenario,	  so	  this	  could	  contribute	  to	  participants	  recalling	  less	  about	  this	  story.	  This	  probably	  cannot	  account	  for	  all	  of	  the	  differences	  in	  memory	  for	  these	  two	  stories,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  hypothesis	  that	  could	  potentially	  be	  tested	  in	  the	  future.	  As	  was	  previously	  mentioned	  in	  the	  results	  section,	  there	  could	  have	  been	  a	  recency	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effect	  where	  more	  information	  was	  recalled	  about	  the	  first	  story	  they	  read	  than	  subsequent	  stories.	  	  	   The	  significant	  interaction	  we	  found	  between	  story,	  category,	  and	  morality	  suggests	  that	  morality	  is	  linked	  to	  greater	  average	  recall	  across	  the	  categories.	  This	  finding	  supports	  the	  trends	  that	  we	  found	  with	  moral	  scenarios	  leading	  to	  greater	  memory	  in	  general	  and	  for	  the	  specific	  categories	  of	  agent	  details,	  action,	  and	  intention.	  Additionally,	  there	  were	  significant	  correlations	  across	  all	  four	  conditions	  between	  every	  information	  category	  except	  for	  agent	  name.	  We	  found	  that	  agent	  name	  correlated	  with	  the	  most	  categories	  for	  the	  moral	  intention	  and	  neutral	  accidental	  conditions	  and	  had	  the	  fewest	  correlations	  in	  the	  moral	  accidental	  condition	  with	  the	  neutral	  intentional	  condition	  having	  three	  significant	  correlations.	  Speculations	  can	  be	  drawn	  about	  these	  correlations,	  but	  what	  they	  mainly	  reveal	  is	  that	  when	  a	  participant	  remembered	  one	  piece	  of	  information	  from	  a	  story	  they	  were	  likely	  to	  remember	  quite	  a	  few	  pieces	  of	  information	  across	  all	  of	  the	  categories.	  	   While	  there	  is	  some	  evidence	  in	  previous	  literature	  to	  suggest	  that	  English	  speakers	  remember	  the	  agents	  of	  intentional	  and	  accidental	  events	  equally	  well,	  we	  did	  not	  explicitly	  find	  this	  to	  be	  the	  case	  in	  our	  study	  (Fausey	  &	  Boroditsky,	  2011).	  Participants	  recalled	  agents’	  names	  better	  for	  the	  intentional	  conditions	  and	  they	  recalled	  details	  about	  the	  agent	  best	  in	  the	  moral,	  intentional	  condition.	  These	  trends	  indicate	  that	  there	  could	  be	  a	  difference	  in	  memory	  for	  agents	  of	  intentional	  or	  accidental	  actions.	  A	  possible	  reason	  this	  could	  refute	  previous	  research	  is	  that	  the	  actions	  used	  in	  this	  research	  were	  simple	  actions	  with	  one	  agent,	  so	  there	  was	  less	  for	  a	  participant	  to	  focus	  on	  (Fausey	  &	  Boroditsky,	  2011).	  However,	  in	  our	  study	  there	  were	  many	  details	  in	  each	  story	  that	  a	  participant	  could	  focus	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on.	  When	  reading	  about	  accidental	  actions	  participants	  focused	  less	  on	  the	  agent	  than	  they	  did	  for	  the	  intentional	  actions	  because	  this	  information	  was	  less	  relevant.	  	  Our	  results	  do	  appear	  to	  align	  more	  with	  research	  on	  memory	  for	  helpers	  or	  hinderers	  acting	  intentionally	  or	  unintentionally	  (Camilleri,	  2010).	  Consistent	  with	  what	  we	  found,	  Camilleri	  found	  that	  participants	  remembered	  the	  triangles	  (agents)	  that	  were	  acting	  intentionally	  better	  than	  those	  that	  were	  acting	  unintentionally.	  Although	  this	  study	  did	  not	  look	  at	  human	  behaviors	  it	  was	  focused	  on	  both	  intentionality	  and	  morality,	  unlike	  Boroditsky’s	  study	  that	  just	  looked	  at	  intentionality.	  Camilleri	  did	  not	  find	  that	  the	  triangle’s	  helping	  or	  hindering	  behavior	  affected	  whether	  participants	  remembered	  it	  or	  not,	  but	  whether	  a	  triangle	  is	  acting	  morally	  or	  immorally	  is	  not	  as	  important	  as	  a	  human	  acting	  morally	  or	  immorally.	  This	  could	  be	  why	  we	  found	  that	  morality	  was	  a	  crucial	  element	  in	  recalling	  more	  details	  about	  an	  agent.	  	  	   In	  addition,	  studies	  on	  the	  intentionality	  bias	  are	  not	  relevant	  here	  because	  Rosset	  (2008)	  found	  that	  people	  only	  assumed	  intentionality	  for	  accidental	  actions	  under	  speeded	  conditions.	  In	  our	  study,	  the	  participants	  had	  plenty	  of	  time	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  actions	  were	  intentional	  or	  accidental.	  Rosset	  also	  found	  that	  participants	  remembered	  sentences	  containing	  accidental	  actions	  better	  than	  those	  containing	  intentional	  actions,	  which	  was	  not	  what	  we	  found.	  We	  found	  that	  intentionality	  improved	  memory	  across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  categories	  of	  information	  present	  in	  the	  stories.	  	  The	  first	  limitation	  is	  that	  the	  study	  would	  benefit	  from	  acquiring	  more	  participants	  in	  each	  condition	  because	  the	  sample	  size	  of	  twenty	  that	  we	  have	  now	  does	  not	  have	  as	  much	  statistical	  power	  as	  we	  would	  like.	  Second,	  since	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  story	  it	  would	  be	  helpful	  to	  develop	  stories	  that	  had	  less	  variation	  so	  that	  the	  effect	  of	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morality	  and	  intentionality	  could	  drive	  differences	  in	  memory	  rather	  than	  the	  stories	  themselves.	  We	  attempted	  to	  create	  six	  stories	  that	  were	  all	  around	  the	  same	  length,	  but	  some	  ended	  up	  being	  slightly	  longer	  than	  others,	  which	  could	  have	  factored	  into	  this	  variation.	  Also,	  certain	  actions	  or	  names	  could	  have	  been	  more	  salient	  in	  one	  story	  as	  opposed	  to	  another	  or	  certain	  contextual	  details	  could	  have	  been	  more	  relevant	  to	  a	  particular	  story.	  For	  example,	  Paul	  (the	  agent	  of	  Story	  6)	  may	  have	  been	  more	  of	  a	  familiar	  name	  than	  Sally	  (the	  agent	  of	  Story	  1),	  or	  the	  fact	  that	  Paul’s	  niece	  had	  a	  severe	  peanut	  allergy	  could	  have	  aided	  in	  remembering	  Paul’s	  actions,	  whereas	  the	  nurse	  on	  duty	  being	  on	  a	  lunch	  break	  might	  not	  have	  been	  as	  relevant	  to	  Sally	  pulling	  out	  the	  feeding	  tube.	  Since	  these	  were	  complex	  actions,	  there	  was	  no	  way	  of	  knowing	  whether	  one	  action	  would	  be	  remembered	  better	  than	  another.	  It	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  normalize	  particular	  information	  like	  the	  salience	  of	  a	  name,	  but	  other	  measures	  could	  have	  been	  made	  to	  normalize	  the	  stories.	  	  Prior	  to	  running	  the	  study	  we	  had	  not	  developed	  a	  coding	  process,	  but	  if	  we	  had	  we	  could	  have	  made	  it	  so	  each	  story	  had	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  details	  for	  each	  category.	  We	  also	  could	  have	  written	  stories	  that	  contained	  actions	  and	  circumstances	  that	  were	  about	  the	  same	  degree	  of	  rarity.	  It	  might	  have	  also	  been	  helpful	  to	  collect	  more	  demographic	  information,	  such	  as	  where	  someone	  is	  from	  because	  this	  could	  have	  affected	  whether	  they	  remembered	  where	  the	  story	  took	  place	  or	  not.	  If	  they	  were	  familiar	  with	  the	  location	  it	  would	  seem	  as	  though	  they	  would	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  remember	  that	  location.	  However,	  what	  is	  clear	  is	  that	  there	  are	  many	  variables	  that	  go	  into	  what	  an	  individual	  remembers	  and	  it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  control	  for	  all	  of	  these	  variables.	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Another	  possible	  limitation	  is	  that	  we	  only	  had	  one	  experimenter	  code	  up	  the	  responses,	  which	  could	  have	  added	  an	  unintentional	  bias.	  To	  improve	  on	  this	  aspect	  of	  experimental	  design	  we	  should	  have	  had	  several	  encoders	  who	  were	  blind	  to	  the	  hypotheses	  of	  the	  study	  code	  up	  the	  responses.	  Due	  to	  the	  subjective	  nature	  of	  the	  coding	  process	  having	  more	  than	  one	  coder	  could	  have	  significantly	  increased	  the	  error	  scores,	  but	  it	  would	  have	  also	  eliminated	  experimenter	  bias.	  Additionally,	  there	  was	  not	  one	  way	  to	  code	  this	  data,	  so	  the	  results	  might	  have	  improved	  if	  another	  encoding	  process	  was	  used	  to	  analyze	  the	  data.	  	   One	  possible	  future	  direction	  is	  to	  extend	  this	  research	  to	  Spanish	  speakers	  to	  look	  into	  whether	  there	  are	  not	  only	  differences	  in	  remembering	  the	  agents	  of	  intentional	  and	  accidental	  actions,	  but	  also	  of	  moral	  and	  neutral	  events	  (Fausey	  &	  Boroditsky,	  2011).	  Although	  there	  were	  objects	  being	  broken	  or	  damaged	  in	  the	  videos	  in	  Boroditsky’s	  study,	  all	  of	  the	  events	  were	  morally	  neutral,	  lacking	  any	  real	  world	  consequences.	  It	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  see	  whether	  moral	  events	  and	  actions	  would	  improve	  Spanish	  speaker’s	  memory	  for	  the	  agent	  of	  an	  action	  even	  if	  it	  were	  an	  accidental	  action.	  Based	  on	  Boroditsky’s	  hypothesis	  that	  language	  itself	  creates	  attentional	  biases	  for	  particular	  aspects	  of	  an	  action,	  there	  could	  be	  further	  research	  to	  see	  if	  we	  could	  manipulate	  this	  attention	  by	  adding	  the	  variable	  of	  morality.	  There	  is	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  linguistic	  framing	  of	  the	  Spanish	  language	  is	  so	  deeply	  ingrained	  that	  even	  when	  presented	  with	  morally	  charged,	  accidental	  actions	  where	  it	  would	  be	  more	  important	  to	  remember	  the	  agent,	  Spanish	  speakers	  are	  still	  worse	  at	  remembering	  the	  agent	  than	  English	  speakers.	  This	  research	  could	  also	  tell	  us	  about	  how	  people	  from	  different	  cultures	  or	  language	  backgrounds	  encode	  moral	  actions.	  They	  might	  remember	  different	  details	  from	  an	  event	  than	  would	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English	  speakers	  due	  to	  their	  distinct	  cultural	  backgrounds.	  With	  the	  population	  of	  Spanish	  speakers	  increasing	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  these	  differences	  in	  encoding	  and	  remembering	  events	  could	  have	  consequences	  for	  eyewitness	  testimony	  and	  moral	  development	  of	  bilingual	  children.	  	  	   An	  additional	  step	  to	  this	  research	  could	  be	  to	  study	  how	  cross-­‐cultural	  differences	  in	  remembering	  events	  could	  affect	  blame,	  responsibility,	  and	  punishment	  judgments.	  	  Previous	  research	  has	  examined	  the	  role	  of	  linguistic	  framing	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  blame	  and	  financial	  liability	  to	  an	  agent	  (Fausey	  &	  Boroditskty,	  2010).	  Like	  their	  cross-­‐cultural	  study,	  this	  study	  too	  looked	  at	  agentive	  versus	  non-­‐agentive	  descriptions	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  this	  linguistic	  framing	  on	  the	  participants’	  perception	  of	  an	  event.	  Legally,	  this	  linguistic	  framing	  has	  important	  consequences	  for	  guilty	  or	  not	  guilty	  verdicts	  and	  how	  an	  action	  should	  be	  punished.	  Participants	  read	  about	  an	  accidental	  restaurant	  fire	  described	  either	  using	  agentive	  language	  or	  non-­‐agentive	  language.	  They	  were	  then	  asked	  how	  much	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  study	  should	  be	  blamed	  for	  the	  fire	  and	  how	  much	  the	  subject	  should	  pay	  for	  the	  damages.	  Participants	  who	  read	  the	  agentive	  description	  assigned	  more	  blame	  and	  financial	  responsibility	  to	  the	  subject	  than	  those	  participants	  who	  read	  the	  non-­‐agentive	  description.	  	  These	  same	  results	  held	  true	  even	  when	  participants	  watched	  a	  video	  of	  Janet	  Jackson’s	  well-­‐known	  and	  controversial	  wardrobe	  malfunction	  at	  the	  2004	  Super	  Bowl	  halftime	  show.	  Even	  when	  these	  participants	  watched	  the	  video,	  they	  were	  still	  swayed	  by	  an	  agentive	  or	  non-­‐agentive	  description	  of	  the	  event.	  This	  study	  is	  especially	  important	  when	  looking	  at	  this	  from	  a	  legal	  standpoint.	  The	  participants’	  judgments	  about	  blame	  and	  financial	  responsibility	  were	  swayed	  based	  on	  linguistic	  framing	  even	  if	  they	  had	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previously	  seen	  the	  event	  take	  place.	  If	  participants	  were	  presented	  with	  stories	  similar	  to	  the	  ones	  we	  tested	  in	  the	  present	  study,	  it	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  note	  whether	  the	  information	  they	  remembered	  from	  the	  stories	  during	  the	  recall	  phase	  would	  affect	  how	  much	  blame	  and	  punishment	  they	  assign.	  A	  possible	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  participants	  who	  remembered	  less	  about	  the	  action	  and	  agent	  would	  assign	  less	  blame	  and	  responsibility	  because	  they	  do	  not	  have	  enough	  information	  to	  deem	  more	  blameworthiness.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  participants	  who	  recall	  less	  specific	  details	  about	  the	  event	  would	  assign	  more	  blame	  regardless	  of	  what	  the	  did	  or	  did	  not	  remember	  simply	  because	  they	  could	  not	  determine	  that	  the	  subject	  did	  not	  deserve	  a	  harsher	  punishment.	  Furthermore,	  since	  the	  non-­‐agentive	  framing	  of	  the	  Spanish	  language	  affected	  how	  well	  Spanish	  speakers	  could	  remember	  the	  agents	  of	  accidental	  events,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  Spanish	  speakers	  will	  not	  assign	  as	  much	  blame	  to	  agents	  of	  accidental	  actions	  as	  would	  English	  speakers.	  Due	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  linguistic	  framing	  on	  blame	  and	  financial	  responsibility,	  this	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  Spanish	  speakers’	  blame	  and	  punishment	  judgments.	  	  Another	  direction	  that	  this	  research	  could	  go	  is	  to	  shorten	  the	  encoding	  time	  for	  reading	  the	  stories.	  Generally,	  participants	  were	  fairly	  successful	  at	  remembering	  certain	  parts	  of	  the	  story,	  but	  with	  a	  shorter	  encoding	  time	  their	  attentional	  biases	  toward	  certain	  details	  might	  be	  stronger.	  This	  could	  also	  test	  how	  long	  people	  need	  to	  encode	  novel	  scenarios	  into	  their	  short-­‐term	  memory.	  In	  addition,	  there	  could	  be	  a	  follow-­‐up	  to	  the	  original	  study	  several	  weeks	  later	  to	  test	  what	  information	  could	  still	  be	  remembered	  from	  the	  stories.	  It	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  see	  how	  memories	  of	  third	  person	  novel	  events	  deteriorate	  and	  fade	  over	  time	  and	  what	  stays	  salient	  in	  the	  memory.	  We	  could	  begin	  to	  see	  what	  information	  gets	  stored	  into	  long-­‐term	  memory,	  not	  just	  short-­‐term	  memory	  to	  be	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recalled	  half	  an	  hour	  later.	  Again,	  this	  has	  implications	  for	  eyewitness	  testimony	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  witnesses	  wait	  weeks	  or	  months	  after	  a	  crime	  to	  testify	  in	  court.	  	  	   Previous	  work	  has	  used	  visual	  representations	  to	  test	  participants’	  memory	  in	  their	  studies,	  which	  could	  be	  another	  direction	  to	  take	  this	  research	  (Fausey	  &	  Boroditsky,	  2011;	  Wood,	  2008).	  Unlike	  Boroditsky	  and	  Wood	  though,	  we	  could	  have	  more	  complex	  actions	  take	  place	  in	  the	  videos.	  Neither	  of	  their	  videos	  consisted	  of	  actions	  that	  were	  morally	  charged,	  they	  were	  simply	  everyday	  actions	  lacking	  any	  consequences.	  However,	  if	  we	  could	  take	  our	  verbally	  presented	  stories	  and	  present	  them	  visually,	  we	  might	  be	  able	  to	  further	  study	  attentional	  biases.	  Presenting	  actions	  visually	  would	  also	  make	  the	  results	  more	  generalizable	  to	  real	  life	  situations	  for	  which	  eyewitness	  testimony	  would	  need	  to	  be	  used.	  	  	   In	  this	  study	  we	  sought	  out	  to	  investigate	  the	  impact	  of	  morality	  and	  intentionality	  on	  memory.	  Even	  though	  we	  did	  not	  find	  significant	  results	  due	  to	  several	  limitations,	  the	  trends	  we	  did	  find	  are	  promising	  and	  suggest	  important	  differences	  in	  how	  intentions	  might	  be	  encoded	  in	  memory	  depending	  on	  the	  moral	  valence.	  Apart	  from	  memory’s	  effect	  on	  our	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  interactions	  with	  the	  people	  around	  us,	  memory	  plays	  a	  large	  role	  in	  eyewitness	  testimony	  and	  can	  be	  the	  determining	  factor	  in	  a	  jury	  deeming	  a	  defendant	  to	  be	  innocent	  or	  guilty.	  Discovering	  how	  actions	  are	  encoded	  in	  memory	  could	  have	  profound	  effects	  on	  the	  efficacy	  of	  eyewitness	  testimony	  in	  court	  cases.	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Appendix	  A	  
	  Story	  1	  
Moral-­‐Intentional:	  Sally	  is	  an	  18-­‐year-­‐old	  volunteer	  at	  a	  local	  hospital	  in	  Norwich,	  Connecticut.	  She	  volunteers	  on	  weekdays	  from	  1-­‐3	  PM.	  While	  the	  nurse	  on	  duty	  is	  taking	  a	  short	  lunch	  break,	  Sally	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  supervising	  an	  unconscious	  old	  man	  on	  life	  support.	  Sally	  walks	  up	  and	  unplugs	  his	  feeding	  tube,	  taking	  the	  man	  off	  of	  life	  support.	  
	  
Moral-­‐Accidental:	  Sally	  is	  an	  18-­‐year-­‐old	  volunteer	  at	  a	  local	  hospital	  in	  Norwich,	  Connecticut.	  She	  volunteers	  on	  weekdays	  from	  1-­‐3	  PM.	  While	  the	  nurse	  on	  duty	  is	  taking	  a	  short	  lunch	  break,	  Sally	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  supervising	  an	  unconscious	  old	  man	  on	  life	  support.	  Sally	  trips	  and	  unplugs	  his	  feeding	  tube,	  taking	  him	  off	  of	  life	  support.	  
	  
Neutral-­‐Intentional:	  Sally	  is	  an	  18-­‐year-­‐old	  volunteer	  at	  a	  local	  hospital	  in	  Norwich,	  Connecticut.	  She	  volunteers	  on	  weekdays	  from	  1-­‐3	  PM.	  While	  the	  nurse	  on	  duty	  is	  taking	  a	  short	  lunch	  break,	  Sally	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  supervising	  an	  unconscious	  old	  man	  on	  life	  support.	  Sally	  walks	  up	  and	  unplugs	  her	  cell	  phone	  charger	  that	  she	  keeps	  nearby.	  
	  
Neutral-­‐Accidental:	  Sally	  is	  an	  18-­‐year-­‐old	  volunteer	  at	  a	  local	  hospital	  in	  Norwich,	  Connecticut.	  She	  volunteers	  on	  weekdays	  from	  1-­‐3	  PM.	  While	  the	  nurse	  on	  duty	  is	  taking	  a	  short	  lunch	  break,	  Sally	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  supervising	  an	  unconscious	  old	  man	  on	  life	  support.	  Sally	  trips	  and	  unplugs	  her	  cell	  phone	  charger	  that	  she	  keeps	  nearby.	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Story	  2	  
Moral-­‐Intentional:	  Ben	  has	  recently	  earned	  his	  driver’s	  license	  in	  the	  state	  of	  Maine,	  and	  is	  frustrated	  because	  his	  parents	  have	  been	  making	  him	  give	  rides	  to	  his	  friends	  and	  family.	  Ben	  drives	  a	  black	  Volkswagen	  Jetta.	  Ben’s	  sister	  calls	  and	  asks	  him	  to	  pick	  her	  up	  from	  the	  parking	  lot	  of	  a	  local	  Target.	  Ben	  pulls	  into	  the	  lot	  and	  sees	  her	  standing	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  road.	  He	  purposefully	  hits	  her,	  knocking	  her	  to	  the	  ground.	  	  
Moral-­‐Accidental:	  Ben	  has	  recently	  earned	  his	  driver’s	  license	  in	  the	  state	  of	  Maine,	  and	  is	  frustrated	  because	  his	  parents	  have	  been	  making	  him	  give	  rides	  to	  his	  friends	  and	  family.	  Ben	  drives	  a	  black	  Volkswagen	  Jetta.	  Ben’s	  sister	  calls	  and	  asks	  him	  to	  pick	  her	  up	  from	  the	  parking	  lot	  of	  a	  local	  Target.	  Ben	  pulls	  into	  the	  lot	  and	  does	  not	  see	  her	  standing	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  road.	  He	  accidentally	  hits	  her,	  knocking	  her	  to	  the	  ground.	  	  	  
Neutral-­‐Intentional:	  Ben	  has	  recently	  earned	  his	  driver’s	  license	  in	  the	  state	  of	  Maine,	  and	  is	  frustrated	  because	  his	  parents	  have	  been	  making	  him	  give	  rides	  to	  his	  friends	  and	  family.	  Ben	  drives	  a	  black	  Volkswagen	  Jetta.	  Ben’s	  sister	  calls	  and	  asks	  him	  to	  pick	  her	  up	  from	  the	  parking	  lot	  of	  a	  local	  Target.	  Ben	  pulls	  into	  the	  lot	  and	  sees	  a	  pothole	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  road.	  He	  purposefully	  hits	  the	  pothole.	  She	  gets	  into	  the	  car.	  	  
Neutral-­‐Accidental:	  Ben	  has	  recently	  earned	  his	  driver’s	  license	  in	  the	  state	  of	  Maine,	  and	  is	  frustrated	  because	  his	  parents	  have	  been	  making	  him	  give	  rides	  to	  his	  friends	  and	  family.	  Ben	  drives	  a	  black	  Volkswagen	  Jetta.	  Ben’s	  sister	  calls	  and	  asks	  him	  to	  pick	  her	  up	  from	  the	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parking	  lot	  of	  a	  local	  Target.	  Ben	  pulls	  into	  the	  lot	  and	  does	  not	  see	  a	  pothole	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  road.	  He	  accidentally	  hits	  the	  pothole.	  She	  gets	  into	  the	  car.	  	  
Story	  3	  
Moral-­‐Intentional:	  Jill	  is	  visiting	  the	  St.	  Louis	  /	  Zoo	  on	  a	  sunny	  day	  in	  September.	  Jill	  enters	  the	  reptile	  house	  in	  order	  to	  see	  the	  rattlesnake,	  a	  venomous	  snake.	  She	  notices	  that	  there	  is	  a	  lever	  to	  open	  the	  door	  of	  the	  cage	  and	  release	  the	  dangerous	  snake.	  She	  pulls	  the	  lever	  causing	  the	  door	  to	  open	  and	  the	  rattlesnake	  to	  escape.	  The	  snake	  bites	  a	  small	  boy	  who	  has	  to	  be	  hospitalized.	  	  	  
Moral-­‐Accidental:	  Jill	  is	  visiting	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Zoo	  on	  a	  sunny	  day	  in	  September.	  Jill	  enters	  the	  reptile	  house	  in	  order	  to	  see	  the	  rattlesnake,	  a	  venomous	  snake.	  She	  notices	  that	  there	  is	  a	  lever	  to	  open	  the	  door	  of	  the	  cage	  and	  release	  the	  dangerous	  snake.	  She	  trips	  on	  the	  lever	  causing	  the	  door	  to	  open	  and	  the	  rattlesnake	  to	  escape.	  The	  snake	  bites	  a	  small	  boy	  who	  has	  to	  be	  hospitalized.	  	  
	  
Neutral-­‐Intentional:	  Jill	  is	  visiting	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Zoo	  on	  a	  sunny	  day	  in	  September.	  Jill	  enters	  the	  reptile	  house	  in	  order	  to	  see	  the	  rattlesnake,	  a	  venomous	  snake.	  She	  notices	  that	  there	  is	  a	  lever	  that	  opens	  a	  hatch	  in	  the	  snake’s	  cage	  and	  releases	  food	  to	  feed	  the	  snake.	  She	  pulls	  the	  lever	  causing	  the	  hatch	  to	  open	  and	  some	  food	  to	  fall	  into	  the	  cage.	  The	  snake	  eats	  the	  food,	  which	  then	  gets	  slowly	  digested.	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Neutral-­‐Accidental:	  Jill	  is	  visiting	  the	  St.	  Louis	  Zoo	  on	  a	  sunny	  day	  in	  September.	  Jill	  enters	  the	  reptile	  house	  in	  order	  to	  see	  the	  rattlesnake,	  a	  venomous	  snake.	  She	  notices	  that	  there	  is	  a	  lever	  that	  opens	  a	  hatch	  in	  the	  snake’s	  cage	  and	  releases	  food	  to	  feed	  the	  snake.	  She	  trips	  on	  the	  lever	  causing	  the	  hatch	  to	  open	  and	  some	  food	  to	  fall	  into	  the	  cage.	  The	  snake	  eats	  the	  food,	  which	  then	  gets	  slowly	  digested.	  	  	  
Story	  4	  
Moral-­‐Intentional:	  Jessica	  receives	  a	  text	  from	  one	  of	  her	  close	  friends	  from	  high	  school	  while	  she	  is	  in	  a	  lecture	  at	  college	  in	  Texas.	  They	  had	  not	  seen	  each	  other	  since	  high	  school	  and	  so	  Jessica	  is	  happy	  to	  see	  that	  she	  received	  a	  text.	  The	  text	  from	  her	  friend	  is	  a	  secret	  that	  is	  meant	  for	  Jessica’s	  eyes	  only.	  Jessica	  purposefully	  hits	  the	  forward	  button,	  sending	  the	  text	  to	  all	  of	  her	  high	  school	  friends.	  	  
Moral-­‐Accidental:	  Jessica	  receives	  a	  text	  from	  one	  of	  her	  close	  friends	  from	  high	  school	  while	  she	  is	  in	  a	  lecture	  at	  college	  in	  Texas.	  They	  had	  not	  seen	  each	  other	  since	  high	  school	  and	  so	  Jessica	  is	  happy	  to	  see	  that	  she	  received	  a	  text.	  The	  text	  from	  her	  friend	  is	  a	  secret	  that	  is	  meant	  for	  Jessica’s	  eyes	  only.	  Jessica	  accidentally	  hits	  the	  forward	  button,	  sending	  the	  text	  to	  all	  of	  her	  high	  school	  friends.	  	  
Neutral-­‐Intentional:	  Jessica	  receives	  a	  text	  from	  one	  of	  her	  close	  friends	  from	  high	  school	  while	  she	  is	  in	  a	  lecture	  at	  college	  in	  Texas.	  They	  had	  not	  seen	  each	  other	  since	  high	  school	  and	  so	  Jessica	  is	  happy	  to	  see	  that	  she	  received	  a	  text.	  The	  text	  from	  her	  friend	  happens	  to	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be	  a	  joke	  that	  her	  little	  sister	  told	  her.	  Jessica	  purposefully	  hits	  the	  forward	  button,	  sending	  the	  text	  to	  all	  of	  her	  new	  college	  friends.	  	  
Neutral-­‐Accidental:	  Jessica	  receives	  a	  text	  from	  one	  of	  her	  close	  friends	  from	  high	  school	  while	  she	  is	  in	  a	  lecture	  at	  college	  in	  Texas.	  They	  had	  not	  seen	  each	  other	  since	  high	  school	  and	  so	  Jessica	  is	  happy	  to	  see	  that	  she	  received	  a	  text.	  The	  text	  from	  her	  friend	  happens	  to	  be	  a	  joke	  that	  her	  little	  sister	  told	  her.	  Jessica	  accidentally	  hits	  the	  forward	  button,	  sending	  the	  text	  to	  all	  of	  her	  new	  college	  friends.	  	  
Story	  5	  	  
Moral-­‐Intentional:	  Chris’	  roommate	  was	  walking	  around	  their	  apartment	  in	  Miami,	  when	  a	  button	  from	  his	  polo	  fell	  off.	  He	  asks	  Chris	  to	  sew	  the	  button	  back	  onto	  his	  shirt	  while	  he	  is	  still	  wearing	  the	  shirt	  as	  he	  is	  in	  a	  hurry	  to	  pick	  up	  his	  parents	  from	  the	  airport	  at	  noon.	  	  As	  Chris	  is	  sewing	  the	  button,	  he	  pauses	  and	  sticks	  the	  needle	  into	  his	  roommate’s	  chest.	  	  	  
Moral-­‐Accidental:	  Chris’	  roommate	  was	  walking	  around	  their	  apartment	  in	  Miami,	  when	  a	  button	  from	  his	  polo	  fell	  off.	  He	  asks	  Chris	  to	  sew	  the	  button	  back	  onto	  his	  shirt	  while	  he	  is	  still	  wearing	  the	  shirt	  as	  he	  is	  in	  a	  hurry	  to	  pick	  up	  his	  parents	  from	  the	  airport	  at	  noon.	  	  As	  Chris	  is	  sewing	  the	  button,	  he	  slips	  and	  sticks	  the	  needle	  into	  his	  roommate’s	  chest.	  	  	  
Neutral-­‐Intentional:	  Chris’	  roommate	  was	  walking	  around	  their	  apartment	  in	  Miami,	  when	  a	  button	  from	  his	  polo	  fell	  off.	  He	  asks	  Chris	  to	  sew	  the	  button	  back	  onto	  his	  shirt	  while	  he	  is	  still	  wearing	  the	  shirt	  as	  he	  is	  in	  a	  hurry	  to	  pick	  up	  his	  parents	  from	  the	  airport	  at	  noon.	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As	  Chris	  is	  sewing	  the	  button,	  he	  pauses	  and	  pokes	  his	  roommate’s	  chest	  with	  his	  forefinger.	  	  	  
Neutral-­‐Accidental:	  Chris’	  roommate	  was	  walking	  around	  their	  apartment	  in	  Miami,	  when	  a	  button	  from	  his	  polo	  fell	  off.	  He	  asks	  Chris	  to	  sew	  the	  button	  back	  onto	  his	  shirt	  while	  he	  is	  still	  wearing	  the	  shirt	  as	  he	  is	  in	  a	  hurry	  to	  pick	  up	  his	  parents	  from	  the	  airport	  at	  noon.	  	  As	  Chris	  is	  sewing	  the	  button,	  he	  slips	  and	  pokes	  his	  roommate’s	  chest	  with	  his	  forefinger.	  	  	  
Story	  6	  	  
Moral-­‐Intentional:	  Paul	  is	  the	  25	  year	  old	  uncle	  of	  two	  young	  girls	  ages	  6	  and	  3	  and	  is	  visiting	  their	  home	  in	  Seattle.	  The	  younger	  of	  the	  two	  girls	  has	  a	  serious	  peanut	  allergy.	  Paul	  is	  to	  prepare	  sandwiches	  for	  his	  two	  nieces	  for	  their	  lunches,	  so	  he	  prepares	  one	  peanut	  butter	  and	  jelly	  sandwich	  and	  one	  tuna	  sandwich.	  Paul	  labels	  the	  two	  bags	  so	  that	  his	  nieces	  can	  grab	  their	  respective	  lunches	  and	  head	  off	  to	  school.	  Paul	  takes	  the	  labels	  and	  changes	  them,	  giving	  the	  peanut	  butter	  and	  jelly	  sandwich	  to	  the	  younger	  niece.	  	  	  
Moral-­‐Accidental:	  Paul	  is	  the	  25	  year	  old	  uncle	  of	  two	  young	  girls	  ages	  6	  and	  3	  and	  is	  visiting	  their	  home	  in	  Seattle.	  The	  younger	  of	  the	  two	  girls	  has	  a	  serious	  peanut	  allergy.	  Paul	  is	  to	  prepare	  sandwiches	  for	  his	  two	  nieces	  for	  their	  lunches,	  so	  he	  prepares	  one	  peanut	  butter	  and	  jelly	  sandwich	  and	  one	  tuna	  sandwich.	  Paul	  labels	  the	  two	  bags	  so	  that	  his	  nieces	  can	  grab	  their	  respective	  lunches	  and	  head	  off	  to	  school.	  Paul	  mixes	  up	  the	  labels,	  however,	  giving	  the	  peanut	  butter	  and	  jelly	  sandwich	  to	  the	  younger	  niece.	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Neutral-­‐Intentional:	  Paul	  is	  the	  25	  year	  old	  uncle	  of	  two	  young	  girls	  ages	  6	  and	  3	  and	  is	  visiting	  their	  house	  in	  Seattle.	  The	  younger	  of	  the	  two	  girls	  loves	  all	  kinds	  of	  sandwiches.	  Paul	  is	  to	  prepare	  sandwiches	  for	  his	  two	  nieces	  for	  their	  lunches,	  so	  he	  prepares	  one	  peanut	  butter	  and	  jelly	  sandwich	  and	  one	  tuna	  sandwich.	  Paul	  labels	  the	  two	  bags	  so	  that	  his	  nieces	  can	  grab	  their	  respective	  lunches	  and	  head	  off	  to	  school.	  Paul	  takes	  the	  labels	  and	  changes	  them,	  giving	  the	  peanut	  butter	  and	  jelly	  sandwich	  to	  the	  younger	  niece.	  	  	  
Neutral-­‐Accidental:	  Paul	  is	  the	  25	  year	  old	  uncle	  of	  two	  young	  girls	  ages	  6	  and	  3	  and	  is	  visiting	  their	  house	  in	  Seattle.	  The	  younger	  of	  the	  two	  girls	  loves	  all	  kinds	  of	  sandwiches.	  Paul	  is	  to	  prepare	  sandwiches	  for	  his	  two	  nieces	  for	  their	  lunches,	  so	  he	  prepares	  one	  peanut	  butter	  and	  jelly	  sandwich	  and	  one	  tuna	  sandwich.	  Paul	  labels	  the	  two	  bags	  so	  that	  his	  nieces	  can	  grab	  their	  respective	  lunches	  and	  head	  off	  to	  school.	  Paul	  mixes	  up	  the	  labels,	  however,	  giving	  the	  peanut	  butter	  and	  jelly	  sandwich	  to	  the	  younger	  niece.	  	  	  	  	  	  
